Apartheid security apparatus withheld wider âhit listâ of activists, inquiry hears

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Testifying at the Khampepe Inquiry on 6 August, human rights lawyer and former TRC commissioner Yasmin Sooka outlined efforts to challenge political pardons for the perpetrators of apartheid-era crimes, specifically those involved in the 1989 poisoning of the Rev Frank Chikane.

Sooka told the commission that in 2007, after a âspecial dispensationâ on political pardons had been announced by President Thabo Mbeki, more than 2,000 perpetrators applied for pardons. An initial list of 150 names, including those convicted for Chikaneâs poisoning, was recommended to Mbeki.

A âreference groupâ, chaired by lawyer Tertius Delport (a former National Party MP), was established as part of this âdispensationâ. Its purpose, said Sooka, was to resolve the âunfinished business of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission [TRC]â by issuing pardons for offences claimed to be âpolitically motivatedâ.

The shadow hand

The commission previously heard that former apartheid generals, including those in Military Intelligence, had weaponised the âChikane matterâ to threaten ANC leaders â including Mbeki â with arrest.

Advocate Anton Ackermann, former head of the TRCâs Priority Crimes Litigation Unit, testified that Jan Wagenaar â the generalsâ legal representative â used groundless threats of imminent ANC arrests to derail post-TRC prosecutions. The inquiry also heard that Wagenaar was unable to produce any evidence to support his claim.

At the time, the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) was about to arrest former police minister Adriaan Vlok, former police commissioner Johan van der Merwe and their underling collaborators, security policemen Gert Otto, Hermanus van Staden and Christoffel Smith for the attempted murder of Chikane.

The arrests should have also included those who procured and manufactured the deadly poison that almost killed Chikane.

The second charge brought against the men, that the then head of Project Coast, South Africaâs chemical warfare programme, Dr Wouter Basson, as well as chemist Dr André Immelman (and others), had also conspired âto commit the crime of murder of persons unknown to the State or to assist with the commission of such murdersâ was struck down during the court case.

The late SAPS national commissioner, Jackie Selebi, the inquiry also heard, continued to push the narrative of imminent ANC arrests, including himself, even after the NPA and Ackermann met with government officials to dispel the rumour.

The former acting head of the NPA between 2007 and 2009, Mokotedi Mpshe, testified in April that the intended arrests in the Chikane matter had led to a âdeep riftâ with Ackermann.

Those who got away

Chikane himself gave emotional testimony to the inquiry that Basson could have been brought to book for the murders of at least 200 opponents of the government.

What had stalled any further prosecutions, he said, was the dismissal of the second count in the prosecution of Vlok and Van der Merwe

Sooka testified that the âreference groupâ dealing with pardons had initially rejected requests by victims and civil society to participate or provide input. In 2009, an interdict was obtained and a landmark Constitutional Court ruling in 2010 established that âno political pardon could be issued without prior consultationâ.

It was a victory for the young democracy and accountability. However, Sooka told the commission that the whole truth of the past and atrocities committed had still not been disclosed.

In the Chikane poisoning case, critics argued that granting pardons would undermine ânational reconciliationâ as the truth was being buried while nameless perpetrators stood on the sidelines and watched.

Evidence presented to the commission makes clear that pursuing ânational reconciliationâ was a delicate balancing act for those tasked with steering the country toward a future free from human rights abuses.

Buried truth

Sooka testified that Vlok and Van der Merwe continued to conceal critical details, including the identities of the âhigher authoritiesâ who ordered the killings, and the names of other activists on a Military Intelligence hit list.

Despite having access to the list, both men refused to disclose any additional targets. âThey appeared to deliberately avoid implicating any living person,â said Sooka.

In his application for a political pardon, Van der Merwe only disclosed two names that were on the âhit listâ discussed during a 1987 meeting: Chikane and SACP leader Joe Slovo, who was in exile at the time.

On 14 July 1986, Vlok briefed the powerful State Security Council (SCC), the highest echelon of the apartheid establishment, on steps to be taken on names on a list of âpolitically sensitive personsâ.

A month before that, the National Party government had declared a State of Emergency, which gave the government wide powers of arrest and detention without trial.

Thousands were detained and held in solitary confinement, including children. Many people âdisappearedâ, and that year alone, four activists died in police custody, including the Northern Transvaal UDF president, Peter Nchabeleng, and an Upington Youth Congress activist, Mxolisi Johannes âDickyâ Jacobs.

Sooka told the commission that at that meeting of the SSC it had been recorded that the list âneeded to be shortenedâ and that âmethods other than detentions must be consideredâ.

She said that it was unclear whether the 1986 list of âpolitically sensitive personsâ was the same âhit listâ discussed a year later with the South African Defence Force.

The 1987 list, compiled by Military Intelligence, explicitly authorised the âeliminationâ of activists in âextreme casesâ.

Van der Merwe had indicated that the meeting had been informed that a âhigher authorityâ had instructed that âdrastic stepsâ using the âfull capacity of the stateâ had to be taken against certain political activists, Sooka told the commission.

By 22 September 1986, this list was officially âaccepted after discussionâ, she added.

A specialised unit had been established for the âexecution of the directive to carry out these unlawful operations and which included the participation of high-ranking officers like Chris Smith, Gert Otto and Roché van Stadenâ, the inquiry heard.

Chikaneâs dilemma

Sooka told the inquiry that in 2012 she met with Chikane, who, at the time, refused to join opposition voices against the presidential pardons.

She said the decision was âdeeply disappointingâ as âperpetrators continued to conceal the truth from the South African public for decadesâ.

Testifying in May, Chikane said that he had been required to retell the story of his attempted murder at so many commissions that it hovered over him like a low, dark cloud.

The veteran churchman said that the TRC was, in the end, âa political project completing our struggle and ending our warâ. There was a saying at the time: ââDonât let the past kill the future.â There were those who felt that,â Chikane told the panel.

South Africa, he said, âended up with a political settlement, and there was the view, which was not codified officially, that we should let sleeping dogs lie in order to avoid destabilisation of the new democratic order. Among those who thought like this, there was not much appetite for looking back.â

Sooka told the inquiry that the refusal to disclose names on âhit listsâ or identify the âhigher authorityâ had made it impossible for investigators to identify other victims targeted by the state.

âThis concealment prevented families and communities of those who perished from knowing exactly what happened to their loved onesâ she said, a requirement that remains âimmensely importantâ for their closure. DM

Reporting originally appeared via Daily Maverick. Read the full source for additional context.